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In this paper we consider linear stationary feedback Nash equilibria of the scalar linear-
quadratic differential game. The planning horizon considered is assumed to be infinite.
l1'e present both necessary and sufficient conditions on the system pararneters for ex-
istence of a unique solution of the associated algebraic Riccati equations (.ARE) that
stabilizes t.he closed-loop system. Moreover, we show that in case there exists more than
one solution of the (ARE) that stabiliz,es the closed-loop system, the spectra of the cor-
respondiug closed-loop systems almost always differ. A numerical algorithm is given to
calculate the solution which yields the most stable closed-loop system.
Keywords: Linear quadratic games, feedback Nash equilibrium, solvability conditions,
Riccati equations
2I. Introduction
During the last decade there has been an increasing interest to study several prob-
lems in economics using a dynamic game theoretical setting. In particular in the area of
environmental economics and macro-economic policy coordination this is a very natural
framework to model problems (see e.g. de Zeeuw et aL (1991), M~ler (1992), Kaitala et
al. (1992) and Dockner et al. (1985), Tabellini (1986), Fershtman et aL (1987), Yetit
(1989), Levine et al. (1994), van Aarle et al. (1995), Neck et al. (1995), Douven et
al (1996)). In, e.g., policy coordination problems usually two basic questions arise i.e.,
first, are policies coordinated and, second, which information do the participating parties
have. Usually both these points are rather unclear and, therefore, strategies for different
possible scenarios are calculated and compared with eachother. One of these scenarios is
the so-called feedback Nash scenario. The scenario we will study here assumes that the
involved parties act noncooperative, that is, each party is only interested in the mini-
mization of his own cost. This bare fact, however, dces not completely specify the game.
The cost each party incurs depends on the decisions made by the other parties. So, there
is still some freedom in specifying which deci~ians will be made hy the parties. We will
assume that the ultimate policies that will be played are such that no party can improve
his outcome by altering his decision unilaterally. In literature this is known as the Nash
equilibrium concept. Furthermore, it is assumed that the strategy used by the parties
is either based on the complete history of the state of the game, or just the initial state
and the current state of the game, or just the current state of the game. This require-
ment on the information structure the players have to determine their strategy leaves
however, in general, still much freedom for the party in chosing his policy. Therefore,
additional requirements have been formulated to restrict the class of possible policies.
A requirement we make here is that the chosen policy must be strongly time consistent.
That is, the parties have no reason at any future stage of the game, to deviate from the
adopted policy even if there have been deviations in the past from the actions which are
dictated by the original policy.
It turns out that it is possible to define a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept
which has the above stated requirements, the so-called feedback Nash equilibrium con-
cept (see e.g. Ba~ar and Olsder (1995) for a precise definition and survey of relevant
literature). In fact, it can be shown that the class of strongly time consistent Nash
equilibria coincides with the class of feedback Nash equilibria (see e.g. Weeren (1995,
theorem 3.24)).
Note that, since according this scenario the participating parties can react to eachot.her's
policies, its economic relevance is mostly larger than that of the open-loop Nash scenari-
o. In particular the feedback Nash scenario is very popular in studying problems where
the underlying model can be described by a(set of) linear differential equation(s) and
the individual objectives, the parties are striving for, can be approximated by function-
s which quadratically penalize deviations from some (equilibrium) targets. Under the
assumption that the parties only have a finite-planning horizon, this problem was first
analyzed by Starr and Ho in (1969) (see also Lukes (1971) for a result on uniqueness
3within t.he class of affine memoryless strategies).
In this paper we study the infinite-planning horizon case. The reason for studying an
infinite-planning horizon can be motivated front at least two reasons. First, in economic
groo-th theory it is usually difftcult to justify the assumption that a firm (or governmcn-
t) has a finite-planning horizon t~; for, why should it ignore profits earned after t~ (or
utilit}~ of generations alive beyond t~). Second, we will see that from a computational
point of view the equilibriurn strategies are much easier to implement and analyze than
those for a finite-planning horizon.
`~'e will concentrate here on solving the with this problem associated algebraic Riccati
eyuatious. In ~~l'eeren et al. (1997) it was shown that in the scalar case these equat.ions
ha~e either one or three solutions which solve the optimization problem. However, a
detailed study imder which conditions on t.he system parameters these different situa-
tions occur is lacking. In this paper we study this subject in detail, and consider the
yuestion under which parameter conditions it is possible to discriminate between the
three solutions if we impose some additional stability requirements. Furthermore, we
consider numerical algorithms to calculate the solutions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In sectinn two we start by stating the problem
analysed in this paper. Section three analyzes the solutions of the algebraic Riccati e-
yuations. Then, in section 4, we analyze the stabilization properties of the solutions and
present in the subsequent section a numerical algorithm to calculate the most stabilizing
solution. The paper ends with some conch~ding remarks.
II. Problem statement
In this paper we consider the problem where two parties (henceforth called players)
try to minimize their individual quadratic performance criterion. Each player controls
a different set of inputs to a single system. The system is described by the following
differential equation
.i - aa f b,ul -f- 6~uZ, x(~) - xo. (1)
Here x is the state of the system, u; is a (control) variable player i can manipulate, zo
is the arbitrarily chosen initial state of the system, a, b,, and 62 are constant system
parameters, and :i denotes the time derivative of x.
The performance criterion player i- 1, 2 aims to minimize is:
~
J~(ui,tiz) :- 2 ~ {~(t)T9~~(t) f u~(t)Tr~~u~(t)}dt.
We assume that both q; and r;; are positive and b; differs from zero.
In this paper we consider in detail the existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium of this
differential game (see Ba~ar and Olsder (1995) for a precise definition of this equilibrium
concept).
Next, consider the following set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (ARE):
-ak, - kla - q, ~- kls,k, f k,s2k2 f k2s2k, - 0; (2)
4-ak2 - k~a - q2 i- k2s2k2 f kZS~k~ f k~sik2 - ~;
wtiere s; :- b;r;;lb;.
From Ba~ar and Olsder (1995, proposition 6.8), we have:
Theorem 1:
Let k; ~ 0 solve the set of Riccati equations.
'Phen the pair of strategies given by
(3)
u; - -r;;lb;k;x (4)
i- 1,'l, provide a feedback Nash equilibrium, leading to the cost J;(ul,u2) :- xoktxo,
for playeri.
Moreover, the resulting system dynamics described by i- a~~x; x(0) - xo, with
a~.~ :- a - slkl - sZkz, is asymptotically stable. O
In fact, one can immediately deduce from Weeren (1995, p.96) that when the players are
restricted at the ~uteet to memoryless strategies (cf. Lukes (1971)) then existence oí a
positive solution to the above scalar Riccati equations is a both necessary and sutticient
condition for existence of a feedback Nash equilibrium.
A natural question which arises is how many solutions the above set of algebtaic Riccati
equations (ARE) have. To analyze this question we introduce (for notational conve-
nience) the variables:
o; :- s;q; and ~c; :- s;k;, i- 1, 2.
Using this notation (2,3) can be rewritten as
-2aki - ai f ~ci t 2~cixs - 6; (5)
-2ares - as f ~c~ t 2~c2ect - 0. (6)








~cr - a - -rcz -~ --; (8) 2 2 ~cZ
intersect in the first quadrant of the (kl, ~cz)-plane. In the next section we will study
this problem in detail.
5III. The intersection points
To visualize the situation, we sketched in figure 1 the hyperbola (7) and (8), respec-
tively.
,
Figure 1: The hyperbola in case a- 2, Q1 - 1, az - Z
From (5) we have that nz - zar"Zo'-K?. Substitution of this into (6) shows that ~cl ~ 0
must satisfy the following equation
2an, -F oi - Ki (2aK, -F- Ql -~i)z z -a -az-f- z t(2ak,fv,-~i)-0.
IC1 4K1
Elementary calculation shows that this equation can be rewritten as
3~c~ - Sak; f(4az - 20, ~- 4oz)wi - o; - 0. (9)
From this equation it is immediately clear that the set of (ARE) equations has at most
four solutions. To analyze the number of positive solutions in some more detail we
consider the Hurwitz matrix H(see e.g. Lancaster et al. (1985, pp.480)) corresponding
with this polynomial (9). This matrix equals
-8a 0 0 0
H- 3 4az - 20, f 4oz -o~ 0
- 0 -8a 0 0
0 3 4az - 201 ~ 4az -ai
Let 0; denote the principal minors of this matrix and a4 be the leading ccef6cient of the
polynomial (9). Then, according the Routh-Hurwitz stability result (see e.g. Lancaster
6et al. (1985, theorem 1:3.9.1)), provided 0; differs from zero the number of positive root.s
(counted with algebraic multiplicities) of the polynomial (9) is given by the mtmber of
alterations of sign in the sequence a4, ~t, ó, ó, ó and has the polynomial no roots on
the imaginary axis. It is easily verified that the principal minors of matrix H are
~t - -Sa; ~2 - -8a(4a~ - 2ot -f- 40~); ,~3 - 64a2oi and O4 - -(8ao~ )Z.
So. under the assumption that both a and (4a2 - 2ot t 4a~) differ from zero, the number
of positive roots equals the number of alterations of sign, n, in the sequence
z
3, -8a, 4a2 - 2ot ~ 402,
-8aat , -oi,
(10)
4a2 - 2at -} 4oz
and the number of negative roots is 4-a. Using this, the next result is easily obtained
Theorem 2:
If a G 0, (ARE) has exact 1 solution satisfying kt ~ 0, k2 ~ 0.
If a~ 0, (ARE) has exact 1 solution satisfying kt G 0, k2 G 0 and either 1 or 3 solutions
satisfying kt ~ 0, k2 ~ 0.
Proof:
First consider the case a G 0. From (10) it is then easily verified that in case
(4a2-2ot f4oZ) differs from zero, a- 1. So, in this case the polynomial has one positive
real zero. Next assume that the corresponding n2 G 0. From (6) we then conclude that
n2 - a- nt - (a - nl)2 -}- a2i whereas from (7) we have that kZ - a- 2nt -} 2.
This yields a contradiction (see also Weeren et al. Lemma 2.6). We therefore conclude
that (ARE) has exact one solution in the first quadrant. Similarly it follows for the case
a~ 0 and (4a2 - 2at ~ 402) different from zero that rr - 3. Analogously it follows then
that (ARE) has exact 1 solution in the third quadrant and at least 1 solution in the
first quadrant. Since in the right half (kt, tc2)-plane the hyperbole (7) has the asymptote
k2 - a- zKl and the ~2-axis is a vertical asymptote of the hyperbole (8) it is easily
verified that both curves intersect either once or thrice.
Finally, we have to consider the degenerated cases a- 0 and 4a~ - 2al -F 402 - 0,
respectively. An elementary detailed study of the corresponding polynomials obtained
from (9) yields then the advertised result. O
Theorem 2 does not completely specify how many solutions the (ARE) equations have
in the first quadrant in case a~ 0. Therefore, we analyze the function
f(z) :- 3x4 - 8ax3 t (4a2 - 2at -f 4a~):rZ - ai (11)
in more detail now.
Differentiation of J yields
f'(x) :- 12x3 - 24aaz -~ 2(4aZ - 201 f 4oZ)x.
So, the stationary points of f are
71) if az - 2oz ~- a~ C p: x~ - 0
2) if az - 2oz f ai 1 0: x~ - 0; xz - a f 3f az - 2az ~ vl and x3 - a-
3 f a2 - loz f o~.
In case 1) it is clear that f can only have one positive zero.
In case 2) things are somewhat more complicated. To analyze this case, first consider
the situation that x3 C 0 or, equivalently, 2az f 2oz - o~ G 0. Elementary analysis shows
then that J has one positive zero again. Finally consider the case x3 1 0. It is easily
verified that in this situation f has exact one positive zero if and only if the product
J(xz)J(x3) ~ 0. Elementary calculations show that f(xz)f(x3) equals
lÓ 8 q( y - 2) ( 7 - ~)~
~( )( )( )~ 27
{-a f 6a oz o~oz f v~ -~ 3 oz o~az f ol t 4a a~ - 2oz e~ ~ oz 20~ - oz .
We like to mention here that this polynomial also showed up in the analysis of Weeren
et al. in (1997). Combining these results with those of theorem 2 yields then
Theorem 3A:
(ARE) has exact 1 solution in the first quadrant if and only if the system parameters
satisfy either one of the following conditions:
1) ac0;
2) az - 2oz ~- v~ G p;
3) 2az f 2oz - o~ G 0;
4) -asfóa4(oZ-o~vz-f-ai)f3(az-aia2foi)zf4az(oi-2oz)(~ifoz)(2o~-oz) ~ p.
In all other cases, (ARE) has three solutions in the first quadrant. ~
A more detailed analysis shows that the above conditions 2) and 3) can be skipped.
In fact the theorem can be refor~nulated as follows:
Theorem 3B:
(ARE) has exact 1 solution in the first quadrant if and only if the system parameters
satisfy either one of the following two conditions:
1) aGO;
2) -asf6a'(az-alazfai)f3(a2-v~vzfQi)zi-4az(o~-2oz)(Qifvz)(Zoi-az) 1 0.
In all other cases, (ARE) has three solutions in the first quadrant. ~
Proof:
8Assume that condition 2) of theorem 3A is satisfied. We show that then condition ~1)
holds. To that end we rewrite o2 as o2 - o~"-' -F p for some positive p. Substitution of
this expression into -as ~ 6a4(o2 - a~oz -f a~) f 3(a2 - o~a2 ~- oi)z f 4az(o~ - 2az)(o~ f
oz)(~?ot - az) (z), Yields 27 s{ 4(a' - oi)-f az r p}z f 2{rz(Q~ - a") t 14azp3 {- 3p4 . Now,
if a4 - v~ ~ 0, then '27 ~{4(a4 - a~) -F az s p}z - Zp2aQ ~ 27 ~ a4tez - 2pza4 ~ 0. So,
(i) is positive. On the other hand, if a" - o~ c 0, it is obvious that (i) is positive too,
which proves the claim.
In a similar way one can show that 4) holds in case 3) is satisfied by rewriting al
as a~ - 2az -~ 2oz ~ p, for some positive p. Substitution into (i) yields 135as -~ (216 f
32402 )as ~(126p z~- 378poz f 270a2)a" -F (108a2 -~ 32p3 f216pa2 f 144}zzaz )az f 18p3az f
2702 i- 3p4 -~ 45pzoz f 54pv2, which obviously is positive. O
To get an impression how the parameter surface satisfying condition 2) of theorem 3B
(for a~ 0) looks like, we first note that this condition can be rewritten as:
3((az f~i f az)z - 3oiaz)2 - 4az(az -F ol ~- oz)3 1 0.
By using the reparametrization o; - a2r„ it is easily verified that for a fixed a we can
visualize this set in a two-dimensional plot from the area 3((1 f rl -{- rz)2 - 3r1r2)z -
d(1 f rz ~- r2)3 ~ 0. This set is visualized in figure 2.
Figure 2: Graph of 3((1 -f rl f r2)z - 3rzrZ)2 - 4(1 t ri -F- rz)3 - 0.
We conclude this section by stressing the fact
Corollary 4:
[f the system parameters do not satisfy any of the conditions mentioned in theorem 3,
the differential game has at least three feedback Nash solutions. O
9IV. Stability of solutions
A natural question that arises in case none of the conditions of theorem 3 is satisfied is
whether it is possible to formulate some (natural) additional requirement on the feedback
Nash solution that is satisfied by only one of the solutions. In Weeren et al. (1997) this
issue was also raised, and it is shown that the additional requirement of dynamic stability
of the solutions is not a sufficient criterion to eliminate this nonuniqueness. If there are
three equilibria, see e.g. Figure 3, the smallest and largest equilibrium (in terms of K1)
are stable equilibria whereas the remaining equilibrium is a saddle-point. An interesting
point, that is not elaborated in the above mentioned paper but which is easily verified,
is that in the symmetric case, vl - o2i the origin (0, 0) is located on a saddle-path. This
suggests that, on the one hand, one can expect computational difficulties in finding the
appropriate equilibrium in a finite planning horizon setting with no penalties on the final
state. On the other hand, one can conclude that the equilibrium outcomes of the game
will depend in that case crucially on the assu~uptions how to penali2e outcomes of the
final state of the game.
Next, we consider the closed-loop stability of the solutions as a criterion to eliminate
nonuniqueness. Our first result is
Theorem 5:
Assume that v, ~ a2.
Then the closed-loop "matrixn a~~ differs for all solutions.
Moreover, in case (ARE) has three different solutions (k,,k2), (l,,(2) and (ml,m~), with
(without loss of generality) k, G 1, G ml, then the smallest closed-loop matrix is at-
tained by either (k,,kz) or (m,,mz).
Proof:
From theorem 1 we have that if (kl, k~) solve (ARE), the corresponding closed-loop ma-
trix a~~ equals a- s~kl - s2k2 or, equivalently, a- n, - ~c2.
Using this we note that (5,6) can be rewritten as
2a~iKi -I- o, -f ~i - 0; (12)
2a~i~z -} oz -F KZ - 0. (13)
Now assume, both the two different solutions (kl, k~) and (!1i IZ) satisfy the above equa-
tion yielding the same closed-loop matrix a~i. From (12) we then get:
2a~~kt f o, f k~ - 0 and 2a~~lt f v, f li - 0.
Subtracting these two equations yields: 2a~(kl - l,) -}- (ki - li) - 0. Since k, ~ l, we
conclude that 2a~ --(kl -} Il). Substituting this into ( 12) gives -(kl -~ l,)kl --o, - k;
or, equivalently, k,l, - ol. Similarly, one can show that under these assumptions also
10the equality kzlz - az must hold.
B,y assumption a~i - a- k~ - kz - a- ll -!z. So, kt -F kz - lt -~- lz. Substitution of the




On the other hand we have from (12,13) that
-2a~~ - ~~ -h ki - ~z -I- kz. (15)
z
Addition of (14) and (15) yields k~kz - az (i), whereas subtraction of them gives rise to
the equality k~kz - o~ (ii). Comparing (i) and (ii) we conclude that the equality ot - az
must hold, which violates our assumption. So, our assumption that both solutions yield
the same closed-loop system must be wrong, which completes the first part of the proof.
To prove the second part of the theorem, we first note that. all three solutions lie on the
hyperhnle (7). Note that on the interval [k~, ml] this hyperbole is a convex linesegment.
It is easily seen that the maximumof the function g(n~, tiz) defined by g(rcl, Kz) :- wi tti2
on this convex linesegment is attained at either one of the endpoints of the segment. S-
ince both closed-loop matrices do not coincide (as we proved above), this shows that the
minimum value of a~i - a- kr - ~cz is attained at either one of the points (k~, kz) or
(mi,mz)- ~
Next, consider the symmetric case, i.e. o~ - az. Obviously, when this condition hold-
s then, whenever (kl,kz) satisfies (ARE) also (k2ik~) solves these equations (see e.g.
(12,13)). In particular the symmetric solution (k, k) is obtained for k- 0 3~ ao
With respect to the corresponding closed-loop systems we have the following
1'heorem 6:
Let a~ - oz. Assume that (ARE) has three different solutions.
Then the closed-loop systems of both non-symmetric solutions coincide. Moreover, the
closed-loop matrix a~~ of the non-symmetric solution is smaller than t.hat of t.he symmet-
ric solution.
Proof:
First we consider the dosed-loop system of the non-symmetric solutions.
Subtracting (13) from (12) yields the equality 2a~i(~c~ - xz) --(~ci - nz). Since we
assume that ~cl ~ ~cz, we obtain from this equality that 2ac1 - -(~c~ ~- ~cz). Using the
definition of a~; - a- K1 - Kz, we conc(ude that 2a - ~c~ ~- ~z. Substitution of this into
a~~ shows that a~~ --a (note that a~ 0 since we assumed that (ARE) has three dif-
ferent solutions!). Note that this result does not depend on the specific structure of the
asymmetric solution. So, we conclude that the closed-loop matrix for both asymmetric
solutions equals -a.
To prove the second statement of the theorem, we calculate the closed-loop matrix of the
11system resulting from the symmetric solution (k, k), which we will denote by a~i(k, k).
Sirnple calculation shows that n~,(k, k) - 3(n -2 az ~- 3a). Since by assumption (ARE)
has three different solutions, it follows immediately from theorem 3 that az ~ a. Using
this, elementary calculations show then that a~i(k,, kz) G a~i(k, k). Which completes the
proof. o
From theorems 5 and 6 we conclude that closed-loop stability is also not a sufFicien-
t criterium to eliminate nonuniqueness completely. In the symmetric case (o, - oz)
things go wrong. On the other hand, we observe that always either at the smallest or
largest equilibrium (in terms of ~cr) the most stable closed-loop system is achieved.
Finally, we consider minimum of total cost incurred by both players in the equilibrium
as a criterion to eliminate non-uniqueness. To that end we first note that since the cost
incurred by a player is given by J; - ~c;ro, z- 1,2. Since these equilibrium points lie
on one hyperbola, it is clear that never one of these equilibria will be Pareto efficient
(that is both players have lower cost in an equilibrium compared to those in another
equilibrium). We first prove the next lemma
Lemma ï:
Both (kr, kz) and (kz, kr) are equilibria of the game if and only if o, - az.
Proof:
Assume that both points a.re equilibria of the game. Then from (5) we have -2akr -
al -F krz t 2krkz - 0 and from (6) we have -2ak, - vz t krz f 2k,kz - 0. Subtracting
both equations yields then vr - oz. The other implication was already noted before. 0
Now, assume Q, ~ oz. Subtracting (5) from (6) yields
-2a(Kr - kz) - or f oz f(~cr - rcz)(~r f kz) - 0.
or, stated differently,
ar - oz
~i f tiz - f 2a. (16)
~r - kz
If both (k,, kz) and (hr, kz) are two different equilibria yielding the same total cost,
i.e. (k, f kz)xo -(k, i- kz)xó (i), it follows then straightforwardly from (16) that also
kr - kz - k, - kz (ii) should hold. Obviously (i) and (ii) together imply that kr - k, and
kz - kzi which contradicts the assumption that both equilibria differ. In case a, - oz,
it is clear from the proof of theorem 6 that total cost in the smallest and largest equi-
librium point are the same, i.e. 2axó. Furthermore elementary calculation shows that
in the symmetric equilibrium (k, k) total cost are 3(a -~ az f 3a)xó. Since Q G az (see
theorem 3), total cost are in this equilibrium point always smaller than 2axó. This yields
Theorem 8:
If Qr ~ oz then total cost differ in all equilibria.
12If ai - a2 then total cost are minimized in the symmetric equilibrium point.
So we conclude that the additional requirement, that amongst all equilibria we look
for an equilibrium which minimizes total cost, always gives rise to a uniyue equilibrium.
IV. Numerical algorithms
In the previous section we saw that the solution t.hat stabilizes the system most, is either
the smallest or largest solution (in terms of ~cl ) in the first quadrant of the (n l, kZ)-plane.
We will now briefly discuss the question how both these solutions can be calculated nu-
merically.
One way is to calculate the roots of the fourth degree polynomial (9) directly. Note that
there exist analytic formula to do this. So, this method seems to suit best in this case.
Another way, which has the advantage that it can be straightforwardly generalized to
the multidimensional case, is presented in the following algorithm
Algorithm 9A:
Step 1 Let i:- 0. Take ~c~ol - 0, and let KZOt be the unique positive definite solution of
the corresponding algebraic Riccati equation (6): 2a~c2ol -~ aa - n:2ot2 - 0.
Step '2 Substitute KZ'~ into (5). Denote the unique positive definite solution of the corre-
sponding Riccati equation by ~c~`}ll: 2(a - kZ`1)Ki~}lt f al - Ki'trt2 - 0
Step 3 5ubstitute ~c~'}'t into (6). Denote the unique positive definite solution of the cor-
responding Riccati equation by nz'tr~: 2(a -~~`t'l)xZ~}Il } a2 -~2't112 - 0
Step 4 Update i and return to step 2 of the algorithm until the process has converged.
[n figure 3, we sketched the figure obtained by enlarging the first quadrant of figure
1.
To illustrate how algorithm 9A works, we copied in figure 4 the left part of this figure
and indicated how the successive iterations in the algorithm are geometrically obtained.
Figure 5 illustrates for the same example algorithm 9B for finding the largest solution
of the (ARE) equations. This figure is obtained from figure 3 by copying the right part
of it.
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Figure 5: Algorithm for finding the largest solution cf. fig.1,3
Algorithm 9B:
Step 1 Let i:- 0. Take ~c~o~ - 0, and let ~clo~ be the unique positive definite solution of
the corresponding algebraic Riccati equation (5): 2a~c~o~ ~- o~ - klo~~ - 0.
Step 2 Substitute ~ci'1 into (6). Denote the unique positive definite solution of the corre-
sponding Riccati equation by ~cz'tl~: 2(a - K~'~)kz`fll ~- o~ -~2'tll~ - 0
Step 3 Substitute ~c~'t'~ into (5). Denote the unique positive definite solution of the cor-
responding Riccati equation by K~'t'): 2(a - kZ`t'))k~~tiJ ~ Q~ - ~c~~t~~2 - 0
Step 4 Update i and return to step 2 of the algorithm until the process has converged.
It is now not difficult to show the following theorem (see also figure 4 for an illustration
of the basic idea of the algorithm)
Theorem 10:
In algorithm 9A, ~c~'~ is monotonically increasing and K2'~ is monotonically decreasing to
the smallest solution of (ARE).
In algorithm 9B, ~ci'~ is monotonically decreasing and kZ'1 is monotonically increasing to
the largest solution of (ARE).
15Proof:
'The proof can be given by induction. We will only give an outline for t.he monotonicity
of the n ~`~ sequence.
Obviously, ni'~ - na~~ ~ 0. So, assume the inequality holds for i - N. Then,
~(N}1) - ~(N)
i i - a - ~z~~ - (s~N~ - a)~ f oi - (a - ~c2N-~~ - (~c~N-i~ - a)~ f oi)
~ZN t) - ~c2N~ f (n2N-~l - a)~ ~- oi - (~c~Nl - a)~ f ai
~ 0,
since by induction ~2N-'~ -~(~N~ , 0 and kz~~ ~ a, di. That k~'~ converges to the smallest
solution of the (ARE) is easily verified too. O
Remark 11:
The generalization of algorithm 9 to the multivariable case is straightforward. In fact,
the corresponding multivariable algorithm, without specification of the initial values,
was also proposed by Freiling et al. in (1996) to find a solution of the (ARE) equations.
Ilawever, in general, the monotonic mnvergence prope[ties mentioned in theorem 10 do
not hold. O
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied feedback Nash equilibria in the two-player linear quadratic
scalar differential game. We showed that the corresponding set of algebraic Riccati e-
quations has either one or three different solutions in the first quadrant and we gave
necessary and sufficient conditions on the system parameters for existence of a unique
solution of these equations.
In order to be able to discriminate between different equilibria we considered three d-
ifferent additional requirements: dynamic stability, stability of the closed-loop system
and minimal total cost for the players.
We noted that always the smallest and largest solution (measured w.r.t. K~ ) are dy-
na~nically stable and the other equilibrium is a saddle point. Furthermore we pointed
out that if oi - 02 the origin is situated on a saddle path. With respect to closed-loop
stabilization we saw that either the largest or smallest solution will stabilize the system
most. A numerical algorithm was devised to calculate both these solutions. In case
Q~ - 02 closed-stability at the largest and smallest equilibrium point is the same. So in
that case, using this criterion, we still have non-uniqueness. If one uses the additional
requirement to choose that equilibrium for which the sum of the cost of both players
is minimal we showed that always a unique equilibrium results. In particular we saw
that if a~ - oz the minimal cost are attained in the symmetric equilibrium. However,
as we already noted, this equilibrium point is dynamically unstable and its closed-loop
stability is worse than in the other equilibria. So, definite answers on which equilibrium
16one should choose seem to be difficult in that situation.
VVe hope that the obtained results may be helpftill in analyzing the more general multi-
player and multi-dintensional case.
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